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Social mobility among Christian
Africans: evidence from Anglican
marriage registers in Uganda,
1895–2011†
By FELIX MEIER ZU SELHAUSEN, MARCO H. D. VAN
LEEUWEN, and JACOB L. WEISDORF∗
This article uses Anglican marriage registers from colonial and post-colonial Uganda 
to investigate long-term trends and determinants of intergenerational social mobility 
and colonial elite formation among Christian African men. It shows that the colonial 
era opened up new labour opportunities for these African converts, enabling them to 
take large steps up the social ladder regardless of their social origin. Contrary to the 
widespread belief that British indirect rule perpetuated the power of African political 
elites (chiefs), this article shows that a remarkably fluid colonial labour economy 
actually undermined their social advantages. Sons of chiefs gradually lost their high 
social-status monopoly to a new, commercially orientated, and well-educated class 
of Anglican Ugandans, who mostly came from non-elite and sometimes even lower-
class backgrounds. The study also documents that the colonial administration and the 
Anglican mission functioned as key steps on the ladder to upward mobility. Mission 
education helped provide the skills and social reference needed to climb the ladder in 
exchange for compliance with the laws of the Anglican Church. These social mobility 
patterns persisted throughout the post-colonial era, despite rising levels of informal 
labour during Idi Amin’s dictatorship.
C olonial influences on African development remain subject to intense debate.On the one hand, it is widely accepted that the arrival of Christianmissionaries
prompted a genuine schooling revolution in Africa. British Africa has been
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2 MEIER ZU SELHAUSEN, VAN LEEUWEN, AND WEISDORF
particularly praised for its benign policies towards missionary schooling.1 Partly
subsidized by the colonial state and a central aspect of their conversion efforts,
Christian missionaries provided the bulk of education across colonial British
Africa.2 On the other hand, British colonial officials discouraged post-primary
education of the general African population, which continued to be a privilege
that was mainly available to sons of African chiefs in order to build African
administrative capacities.3 Africans from non-ruling classes were typically debarred
from higher education, which therefore did not serve as a ‘ticket to upwardmobility’
for the average African.4
Still, it is well documented that Christian missionary activities left their mark
on African religious beliefs, living standards, literacy, and gender-unequal access
to education and labour markets.5 However, although mission schooling has
continued to affect human capital and religious beliefs of Africans until the present
day, it remains an open question to what extent mission education translated into
social mobility. In particular, did mission schooling expand the possibilities for
social advancement in the colonial economy, or did it merely strengthen the power
of a pre-colonial minority elite?6 To date, the absence of intergenerational micro-
data prior to the 1980s, when census and survey statistics began to emerge, has
confined empirical investigations of social mobility in sub-Saharan Africa to the
post-colonial era.7
The existing, mainly qualitative, literature on African social mobility under
colonial rule has conveyed two opposing views: one of optimism and one of
pessimism. The optimistic view points out that newwindows of opportunity opened
up during the colonial era for those Africans who acquired the formal skills needed
to achieve social advancement. These opportunities supposedly concerned white-
collar work for the colonial administration, in railway and trading companies,
and for the missionary societies.8 This view also holds that many Africans
welcomed mission schools as a means of adjusting to the new colonial labour
market conditions, finding that the ability to read and write in the metropolitan
language facilitated upward mobility.9 It has been argued that mission schooling
became a novel source of social-class differentiation, which accelerated a new
class differentiation among parts of Africa’s population.10 According to Falola and
Heaton, formal education became ‘the stepping stone to a middle-class career’
in urban centres.11 Literacy helped build life-long proficiencies, which made
1 Cogneau and Moradi, ‘Borders that divide’; Dupraz, ‘French and British colonial legacies’.
2 Berman, ‘African responses’; Frankema, ‘Origins’.
3 Sutton, ‘Education’; Lloyd, Kaufman, and Hewett, ‘Spread of primary schooling’.
4 Bolt and Benzemer, ‘Understanding’, p. 31.
5 Nunn, ‘Religious conversion’; Wantchekon, Novta, and Klasˇnja, ‘Education’; Gallego and Woodberry,
‘Christian missionaries’; Fourie and Swanepoel, ‘Selection’; Meier zu Selhausen, ‘Missionaries’; Meier zu
Selhausen and Weisdorf, ‘Colonial legacy’; Montgomery, ‘Gender inequality’; Nunn, ‘Gender’; Meier zu
Selhausen, Moradi, and Jedwab, ‘Economics of missionary expansions’.
6 Henceforth, the term ‘pre-colonial’ refers to nineteenth-century Uganda before its British annexation.
7 Louw, van der Berg, and Yu, ‘Convergence’; Dumas and Lambert, ‘Educational achievement’; Bossuroy and
Cogneau, ‘Social mobility’; Lambert, Ravallion, and van de Walle, ‘Intergenerational mobility’. One exception is
a study on colonial Benin; Wantchekon et al., ‘Education’.
8 Iliffe, Africans, p. 230; Frankema, ‘Origins’.
9 Horton, ‘African conversion’; Iliffe, Africans, pp. 219–29.
10 Kilson, ‘Social classes’, p. 371.
11 Falola and Heaton, History of Nigeria, p. 127.
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SOCIAL MOBILITY AMONG CHRISTIAN AFRICANS 3
children’s future social status less dependent on their father’s social position or
wealth, in the form of land or livestock, for example.12 African parents thus sent
their children to mission schools not just for their spiritual enlightenment, but
also to promote their social advancement by way of their acquisition of formal
skills,13 and in order to take advantage of the large skill premium that clerical and
administrative work would pay.14 For a new generation of young Africans, mission
schools therefore opened up ‘worlds very different from those of their parents’15
and became ‘colonial Africa’s chief generator of social mobility and stratification’.16
The pessimistic view conversely questions the extent to which mission education
and the colonial economy actually benefited African social mobility. A longstanding
argument in the literature is that Africans were treated as secondary people in their
own country.17 Colonial reluctance to build a well-educated African elite meant
that mission schools rarely taught curricula beyond basic levels.18 The benefits
of receiving formal western education also depended on the job opportunities
available to Africans in the colonial economy. In Uganda, Europeans and a
burgeoning Asian community are said to have dominated the colonial labour
market for skilled work, while Africans themselves were relegated to lower and
unskilled manual work.19 This argument is supported by evidence of racial labour
discrimination and of wages for unskilled urban work being near subsistence
level.20 Moreover, profitable earning possibilities in cotton and coffee cultivation
discouraged urban migration and thus offset the prospects for social mobility
linked to secondary and tertiary sector work.21 A further issue concerns ‘indirect
colonial rule’, a British system of governance used to maintain law and order at
low cost, organized through local tax-collecting administrative chiefs.22 Indirect
rule is widely held to have perpetuated the power of colonial political elites into the
post-colonial era by placing local administrative authority in the hands of chiefs,
a situation that has been described as decentralized despotism.23 This chimes
with evidence that the sons of chiefs were disproportionally favoured during the
colonial era in terms of access to secondary education,24 which consolidated the
political power of chiefs while leaving ordinary Africans with limited prospects
for upward social mobility. In Uganda, according to Reid, ‘social mobility had,
if anything, decreased under the British’, with the exception of a ‘narrow social
group of landholders and lineages close to the British administration’.25
This article opens up a new avenue for the study of African social mobility
and colonial political elite formation using hitherto unexplored source material
to shed light on the debates described above. Our data originate from some of
12 Kelley and Perlman, ‘Social mobility’.
13 Foster, Education, p. 66; Berman, African reactions, p. xi.
14 Isichei, History of Christianity, p. 240; Apter, Political kingdom, p. 74.
15 Reid, History of modern Africa, p. 210.
16 Iliffe, Africans, p. 229.
17 Rodney, How Europe underdeveloped Africa, pp. 203–82; Amin, ‘Underdevelopment’.
18 Sutton, ‘Education’; Lloyd et al., ‘Spread of primary schooling’.
19 Southall, ‘Determinants’, p. 561; Elkan, Migrants, pp. 48–50; Kabwegyere, ‘Asian question’.
20 Jamal, ‘Asians’; Frankema and van Waijenburg, ‘Structural impediments’.
21 de Haas, ‘Measuring’.
22 Lugard, Dual mandate, pp. 175–229.
23 Mamdani, Citizen and subject, pp. 52–61; Collins, Problems, p. 85.
24 Cartey and Kilson, Africa reader, p. 77; Goldthorpe, African elite, p. 2.
25 Reid, History of modern Uganda, p. 217.
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4 MEIER ZU SELHAUSEN, VAN LEEUWEN, AND WEISDORF
the earliest Anglican parish registers in Uganda, collected from Uganda’s capital
city Kampala and from rural areas in Western Uganda. What makes these registers
exceptional is that the Anglican ChurchMissionary Society was the only institution
in Uganda to record systematically the occupations of both Ugandan grooms and
their fathers during the colonial (1894–1962) and post-colonial (1962–present)
eras. The sampled records include occupational statistics for 14,167 pairs of fathers
and sons. We code the occupations using a standardized international occupational
classification system (HISCO) and further organize them into social classes based
on the skill-content of their work activity (usingHISCLASS).26 We then perform an
intergenerational social mobility analysis, while tracking the changing occupational
trajectories of the sampled Anglican grooms across the long twentieth century.
The sampled grooms originate from all layers of Ugandan society. Their fathers’
social backgrounds range from low-status jobs, such as cowherds and shepherds,
to high-status jobs including medical doctors and colonial officials. Although the
social backgrounds of the sampled grooms represent the entire social ladder, we do
not expect the grooms themselves to represent the broader Ugandan population
or, in the case of our urban sample, the wider population of Kampala. The fact
that the sampled grooms celebrated an Anglican church marriage meant they
were born to parents who, by their choice of religion and compliance with the
rules and regulations of the Anglican Church, had positioned their children in a
social network that afforded them a wide range of educational and occupational
opportunities. Therefore, if mission schooling led to social advancement among the
general population in colonial Uganda, then we would expect to see it materialize
among the sampled grooms.
Our social mobility analysis shows that the occupational possibilities for the
sampled grooms expanded dramatically across the colonial era, resulting in greater
and considerably more equal opportunities for upward social mobility. That is,
our Christian-educated grooms were able to take large intergenerational jumps up
the social ladder regardless of their social origin. The micro-evidence presented
also suggests that the colonial labour market was remarkably fluid, gradually
eroding pre-colonial and colonial-period political power structures. During the
early colonial era, sons of chiefs were more likely than sons of lower-class fathers
to reach the top of the social ladder. However, towards the end of the colonial
era, traditional claims to status no longer conferred automatic advantages upon
the sons of chiefs. Moreover, we do not observe a ‘buffer zone’ preventing sons of
blue-collar fathers from entering white-collar work. On the one hand, this indicates
that meritocratic principles grew in importance as a determinant of social status,
with mission education and the colonial economy providing new means to achieve
social advancement among our sampled Anglicans. On the other hand, compliance
with the laws of the Anglican Church may have presented a new barrier to social
advancement into the upper echelons of colonial Uganda.
I
By the time of the Scramble for Africa, in the 1880s, the kingdom of Buganda was
the most advanced entity of the four co-existing central states (Ankole, Bunyoro,
26 van Leeuwen, Maas and Miles, HISCO; van Leeuwen and Maas, HISCLASS.
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SOCIAL MOBILITY AMONG CHRISTIAN AFRICANS 5
Busoga, and Toro) in today’s Uganda.27 Buganda owed its affluence to its well-
drained and fertile lands allowing for intensive banana cultivation, which supported
one of the greatest agglomerations of population in the interior of East Africa.28
Buganda was ruled by a kabaka (king), who administered the kingdom through his
katikkiro (prime minister) along with an administrative apparatus of appointed and
hereditary chiefs at various regional levels that in turn commanded and taxed the
local bakopi (farmers).29 Though most engaged in farming, Buganda’s population
also specialized in a variety of craft skills, such as barkcloth, leather, pottery, canoe-
making, and iron-working crafts.30
Political office and territorial chieftainship in Buganda were based neither
exclusively on inheritance, nor on kinship.31 Although sons of chiefs had an
advantage over others, appointment as chief depended on winning the king’s
favour during his regency or aligning with influential royal networks during the
process of succession after a king’s death.32 This system of ‘meritocracy’ created
acquisitive social structures, where men competed for social positions at the royal
court.33 Farmers and chiefs alike strived to send their sons to the royal palace to
serve as mugalagala (pages) in the hope of establishing a path for their children’s
social advancement.34 The result was that social upward mobility in Buganda
was determined by ‘an extraordinary rat-race of rivalry’35 with ‘strongly marked
differentiation of wealth and status, but at the same time something like equality
of opportunity’.36
By the late 1870s, Anglican and Catholic missionaries had reached the kingdom
of Buganda. The Baganda37 embraced mission schools and literacy from the
very beginning, and Christian converts quickly made up a considerable body of
adherents at the Buganda court.38 Religious confrontations and the kabaka’s fear
of losing his political power meant that war broke out in the late 1880s between
different religious factions. In 1893, the ‘flag’ followed the ‘cross’. Britain restored
order and subsequently annexed Buganda as a Protectorate in 1894, governing
through indirect rule as constituted in the Uganda Agreement of 1900.
Under theUgandaAgreement, over half of Buganda’s landwas allotted to Baganda
chiefs and private landowners.39 The Agreement marked the political victory
of Anglican chiefs in Bugandam who were overwhelmingly favoured in terms
of land distribution. This reinforced their dominant position within the ruling
elite.40 Landed county- and sub-chiefs also became salaried colonial-state officials,
who collected the colonial hut tax, enforced compulsory labour schemes, and
administered local justice. This arrangement redirected the authority of traditional
27 See online app. S1 which shows the geographical location of Uganda’s kingdoms.
28 Wrigley, ‘Buganda’.
29 Wrigley, ‘Changing economic structure’, p. 19; Reid, Political power, pp. 3–5.
30 Roscoe, Baganda, p. 356; Reid, Political power, p. 97.
31 Roberts, ‘Sub-imperialism’.
32 Kodesh, ‘Renovating’.
33 Fallers, ‘Despotism’; Wrigley, Crops and wealth, p. 73; Twaddle, ‘Ganda receptivity’.
34 Fallers, King’s men, p. 10.
35 Taylor, Growth, p. 22.
36 Wrigley, ‘Changing economic structure’, p. 20.
37 The term ‘Baganda’ is the plural form of the word referring to the indigenous population of Buganda.
38 Oliver, Missionary factor, p. 77.
39 Jørgensen, Uganda, p. 49.
40 Southall, ‘Determinants’, p. 575.
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6 MEIER ZU SELHAUSEN, VAN LEEUWEN, AND WEISDORF
Baganda chiefs41 away from traditional royal ties and towards the colonial state
and the Christian mission.42 It enabled chiefs to extract substantial rents from the
peasantry, who became their tenants and cultivated increasing quantities of cotton
and coffee.
Close ties with Christianity became an avenue to social and political status.43 The
Anglican Church and the British colonial administration strengthened Baganda
influence over the distribution of political and clerical posts in the Protectorate, at
the expense of Catholics and Muslims as well as other ethnic groups.44 More than
anywhere else in British Africa, mass conversion to Christianity soon occurred at
all echelons of society in Buganda, triggered by a considerable demand for mission
education, spread by local evangelists and teachers.45
Kampala, the capital city of Buganda, formed the heart of missionary efforts.
The fact that missionaries ‘established schools based on achievement criteria’
meant that ‘status achievement and social mobility quickly became associated
with schools’, and that ‘schooling and mobility soon became synonymous’.46 This
facilitated ‘significant changes in Ugandan society and would enable successful
students to enjoy a degree of social mobility unknown to their parents’.47
II
The Anglican marriage registers used for the social mobility analysis below have
been collected from four parish archives—Namirembe Cathedral in Kampala, as
well as three parishes from the Ruwenzori Diocese in Western Uganda: St John’s
Cathedral in Fort Portal, St Barnabas’ Church in Bundibugyo, and St Peter’s
Church in Butiti.48 These parishes are among the longest-runningmission churches
in Central and Western Uganda, allowing us to study the extent to which the
colonial era represented a break with pre-colonial social mobility and socio-political
power structures.
Namirembe Cathedral, which is adjacent to Buganda’s royal palace in Kampala,
is Uganda’s oldest cathedral and most prestigious place of worship. Kampala was
the principal node of the British Protectorate’s administration. The population
of ‘greater Kampala’ (Kyadondo County) grew from 37,000 in 1900 to over
105,116 in 1921 (table 1) to reach 330,700 in 1969 and 774,241 in 1991.49
Kampala remained Uganda’s largest urban centre by far during the colonial and
post-colonial eras. It offered the country’s best educational opportunities50 and the
largest per-capita concentration of Anglicanmission churches and schools (table 1).
41 By 1935, 10 of 18 county chiefs and 92 of 153 sub-county chiefs were Anglicans; Peterson, ‘Politics’, p. 207.
42 Hanson, Landed obligation, pp. 114–15; Musisi, ‘Morality’.
43 Kasozi, Bitter bread, p. 13; Twaddle, ‘Bakungu chiefs’.
44 Roberts, ‘Sub-imperialism’; Hansen, Mission, p. 325; de Haas and Frankema, ‘Gender’.
45 In 1904, for instance, 2,500 Africans taught in 170 Protestant primary schools and served in 162 stations,
while European missionaries only represented 3% of the total number of Protestant church workers; Dwight, Blue
book of missions, p. 36; Oliver, Missionary factor, p. 184; Hastings, Church in Africa, pp. 464–78.
46 Berman, African reactions, p. 26.
47 Paige, Preserving order, p. 32.
48 See online app. S1 which shows the geographical location of sampled parishes.
49 Uganda, Census Returns 1921; MoFPED, Census 1969; UBOS, Census 1991.
50 de Haas and Frankema, ‘Gender’.
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SOCIAL MOBILITY AMONG CHRISTIAN AFRICANS 7
Table 1. Christian population, Anglican followers, churches, and schools in Kampala
and Toro
Total
population
Christian
followers
Anglican
churches
Anglican
primary schools
1921 Kampalaa 105,116 44,207 94 48
1921 Toro District 117,397 28,295 104 17
1945 Kampalaa 133,000b 54,017 99 n/a
1945 Toro District 216,106 79,799 204 n/a
Notes: a Kyadondo County consisted of Kampala, its peri-urban areas, and some rural areas.
b Denotes the population of Kyadondo in the year 1948.
Sources: Uganda, Census Returns 1921; East African Statistical Department, African Population; Uganda, Blue Book (1945).
This, along with Kampala’s transport infrastructure and commercial enterprises,
probably provided the greatest prospects for social mobility in colonial Uganda.
Efforts to Christianize the traditional centre of African power were not confined
to Buganda. They also took place in Western Uganda’s Toro Kingdom, where the
Anglican mission was promoted by the omukama (king) Kasagama. By 1921, 37
per cent of Toro’s population were affiliated with Christian churches (table 1),
of which one in three were Anglican. When British protection was extended to
Toro in 1896, Kasagama sought a strategic alliance with the Anglican mission in
Buganda,51 causing Christian conversion to thrive in Toro as well.52
The three parishes from Western Uganda are all located in Toro County, which
is positioned in an agricultural zone stretching along the Rwenzori mountains
about 300 kilometres west of Kampala. Commercial agriculture intensified there
when smallholders began to grow cotton in the 1920s and coffee in the 1930s,
but there were limited earning opportunities outside farming. Fort Portal was the
most populated place, hosting the seat of the king of Toro and the British district
headquarters. It was home to the first Anglican church in Toro, founded in 1896.
Fort Portal’s population grew from 1,824 in 1921 to over 8,000 in 1969, reaching
33,000 by 1991. Butiti emerged in 1900 as a mission station east of Fort Portal.
Bundibugyo, the main town of Bundibugyo District, is remotely located west of
Fort Portal near the Congo border. Bundibugyo grew from about 3,000 people in
1969 to some 7,000 in 1991.
Some of the observed population growth in Kampala is explained by labour
migration from Belgian-ruled Ruanda-Urundi, which grew in importance during
the colonial era.53 According to Uganda population censuses, 3 per cent of the
adult male population in greater Kampala were migrants from Ruanda-Urundi in
1931, and 0.2 per cent in the Fort Portal area.54 Those shares increased to 22 per
cent of Buganda inhabitants and 10 per cent of Western Uganda’s total population
by 1959.
Our marriage registers furnish the earliest individual-level data available for the
study of intergenerational social mobility in Uganda. They provide information
51 Hansen, Mission, pp. 126–33.
52 Ingham, Kingdom of Toro, p. 87.
53 Richards, ed., Economic development, pp. 29–51.
54 Uganda, Census Returns 1931; idem, Census Returns 1959.
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8 MEIER ZU SELHAUSEN, VAN LEEUWEN, AND WEISDORF
about dates of marriage; names and ages of spouses; marital status before marriage
(that is, bachelor/spinster, widow/widower); and places of residence of spouses at
the time of marriage. Baganda names overwhelmingly dominate the register. The
colonial-era migrants coming from Ruanda-Urundi, identified by Kinyarwanda or
Kirundi names, only make up 0.8 per cent of our Kampala sample between 1930
and 1960 and hence do not represent an important share of our sampled grooms.55
The original forms used to record the marriages, filled out by Anglican ministers,
were pre-printed in London. This ensures a systematic and time-consistent
recording of ecclesiastical events, exactly as in Britain. The Church of England
stipulated that the Church Missionary Society recorded the occupations of both
groom and bride, as well as those of their fathers. While almost all occupations
are recorded in English, the earliest of our Kampala registers (1895–8) include
occupations in Luganda, the language spoken in Buganda. We translated these
into English.56 In order to concede approval of their marriage, spouses left either
their signature on the marriage certificate or an ‘X’ mark or thumbprint in case
of illiteracy. This so-called ‘signature literacy’ is widely used among historians to
assess a person’s ability to read and write.57 In our case, a signature provides a very
strong signal of mission school attendance by a sampled groom.
Anglican missionaries were not the only Christian missionaries in Uganda.
Protestant Mill Hill missionaries along with Catholic mission societies, including
the White Fathers and the Verona Fathers, also competed for ‘souls’. Conjugal
statistics from the early colonial period report that one-third of all Christian
marriages were Protestant and two-thirds Catholic.58 Other mission societies did
not, however, follow the Anglican practice of recording spouses’ occupations, which
prevents us from conducting comparative social mobility analyses between different
religious groups.
Social mobility analysis requires an occupational coding scheme. For this, we
use the Historical International Classification of Occupations, known as HISCO.59
HISCO is the historical equivalent of ISCO, a contemporary coding scheme
used by statistical agencies worldwide for the purpose of international work
comparisons.60 Similar to ISCO, HISCO contains more than 1,600 detailed
descriptions of work activities, classifying virtually all forms of work that existed
in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries worldwide. The use of HISCO
therefore makes our Ugandan social mobility analysis directly comparable to
other HISCO or ISCO studies carried out in other regions, today and in the
past.
Once our occupations were classified in HISCO (see below), we grouped them
into a multiple social-class system based on skill levels and known as HISCLASS.
HISCLASS was originally designed to map occupational titles into 12 social
classes to distinguish work activities according to four dimensions: manual versus
non-manual labour; supervisory versus non-supervisory labour; primary versus
55 Doyle, ‘Parish baptism registers’, pp. 290–1, only observed 5% non-Ganda names in Catholic marriage
registers in Buganda.
56 Hanson, Landed obligation, pp. 243–6; Taylor, Growth, pp. 282–3.
57 Rachal, ‘Measuring’; Schofield, ‘Dimensions’.
58 Meier zu Selhausen, ‘Missionaries’.
59 van Leeuwen et al., HISCO.
60 ILO, International standard classification of occupations.
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SOCIAL MOBILITY AMONG CHRISTIAN AFRICANS 9
Table 2. Occupational groups according to the original and our adapted HISCLASS
scheme
HISCLASS
12
HISCLASS
6 HISCLASS label Examples Work type
1 I Higher managers Chief, interpreter, landholder,
lawyer, medical doctor
Non-manual
2 Higher professionals
3 II Lower managers Clerk, medical assistant,
policeman, shop owner,
sub-chief, teacher, trader
Non-manual
4 Lower professionals
5 Lower clerical/sales
6 III Foremen Carpenter, cook, mason,
mechanic, smith, tailor
Manual
7 Semi-skilled workers
8 IV Farmers Cultivator, farmer Manual
9 V Lower skilled workers Barkcloth maker, builder,
domestic servant, mat
maker, office messenger,
petty trader, soldier
Manual
10 VI Lower skilled farm workers Farm worker, cowherd,
fisherman, houseboy,
shepherd, sugarcane worker
Manual
11 Unskilled workers
12 Unskilled farm workers
Source: Based on authors’ condensed version of HISCLASS; van Leeuwen and Maas, HISCLASS, pp. 131–81.
non-primary sector labour; and finally, higher-, medium-, lower-, or unskilled
labour.61 Manual work is generally considered to be of lower status than non-
manual work; supervisory jobs of higher status than subordinate ones; and labour
involving a higher degree of human capital is generally of a higher status than
labour needing fewer skills.
The original 12 HISCLASS groups are sometimes condensed into fewer groups,
either for particular research questions or because the data are too thin for some
classes. Here, we have collapsed the 12 classes into six, as reported in table 2.62 This
categorization sets the social-class limits wide enough to allow certain occupational
titles to change their social standing over time without breaking the social-class
boundaries. Also, even if the social status of a barkcloth maker or basket maker
increased or decreased relative to that of a doctor or a teacher, the latter occupations
would still remain of higher status than the former.
It was occasionally necessary to contextualize certain Ugandan occupations. The
title ‘chief ’,63 because of the nature of job functions in colonial Uganda, was coded
as ‘legislative official’.64 ‘Sub-chiefs’ received the auxiliary status code for being
subordinate, since they earned a quarter of the annual salary of county chiefs.65
61 van Leeuwen and Maas, HISCLASS.
62 A detailed breakdown by class of sampled occupations is provided in online app. S2.
63 Three hierarchical ranks of chiefs existed in Uganda: county chief (saza), sub-county chief (gombolola), and
parish chief (muluka). The titles of ‘chiefs’ in the marriage registers, however, do not always allow us to disentangle
their hierarchy.
64 Richards, East African chiefs, pp. 41–77; Gartrell, ‘British administrators’.
65 Jørgensen, Uganda, p. 88.
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10 MEIER ZU SELHAUSEN, VAN LEEUWEN, AND WEISDORF
‘Teachers’ have been coded as ‘primary school teachers’, since most schools in
colonial Uganda were primary schools.66 This coding decision may underestimate
the status of ‘teachers’ in the late colonial and post-colonial eras, when secondary
schooling and technical colleges grew in importance, but this has no implications
for our overall conclusions.
The absence of information about acreage of land, types of crops grown,
or number of farm-hands employed makes it somewhat difficult to classify the
occupational title ‘farmer’. We believe that the majority of farmers found in our
registers were tenants on chiefs’ lands, at least until the mid-colonial era. No
advanced agricultural technology (for example, the ox-plough) was used, and the
average land size was less than six acres.67 Farming tools were mainly iron hoes,
and fertilizers and pesticides were rare.68 On the one hand, because agricultural
technology was rather rudimentary, and since only a minority of the Baganda
population presided over large estates with dozens of tenant farmers,69 it may be
tempting to categorize the many ‘farmers’ that we observe as ‘subsistence farmers’.
On the other hand, owners ofmailo (freehold) estates could earn substantial returns
from cotton and coffee cultivation.70 Since the information available in the registers
does not allow us to distinguish between freeholders and tenants, we have placed
‘farmers’ in class IV of our condensed version of the HISCLASS scheme (see
table 2). This positions ‘farmers’ higher in the social hierarchy than ‘subsistence
farmers’ and ‘agricultural workers’, who both appear in class VI, but lower than
‘major landowners’, who appear in class I. A similar coding hierarchy was used in an
earlier social mobility analysis ofWesternUganda.71 Moreover, farmers rank higher
in HISCLASS than low-waged workers, such as office messengers and domestic
servants, but are deemed to be of lower status than high-waged employees, such as
clerks, lawyers, and medical doctors.
If HISCLASS is supposed to be relevant in an African context, then we would
expect to find that income and occupational status are somehow associated. To
explore the case of colonial Uganda, we used monthly incomes of male workers
reported by Jørgensen and by Southall and Gutkind.72 Jørgensen lists only salaried
workers, whereas Southall and Gutkind also include self-employment. In total,
these studies contain 75 different occupations of more than 600 African workers
in Kampala around 1952–3. All six of our social classes in table 2 are represented.
Figure 1 shows a clear and positive association between monthly income and social
class as defined by HISCLASS. The distinction made by Elkan between skilled
and unskilled earnings in Kampala in 1957, set to 80 Ush,73 is clearly visible in
1 classes I to IV never earned less than 86 Ush. This exercise inspires confidence
that social mobility, as measured by HISCLASS, proxies well for income mobility
in colonial Uganda.
66 Ssekamwa, History and development, pp. 40–1.
67 Mukwaya, Land tenure, p. 37; de Haas, ‘Measuring’.
68 Wrigley, ‘Buganda’.
69 Richards, ed., Economic development, p. 5.
70 de Haas, ‘Measuring’.
71 Kelley and Perlman, ‘Social mobility’.
72 Jørgensen, Uganda, p. 115; Southall and Gutkind, Townsmen, pp. 115–17.
73 Elkan, Migrants, p. 75.
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Figure 1. Monthly income and social class of male workers in Kampala, 1952–3
Note: County- and sub-county chiefs are not included, because they received free housing and government pensions, and owned
large estates that generated income which is not included in the reported earnings; Jørgensen, Uganda, p. 88.
Source: Southall and Gutkind, Townsmen, pp. 115–17; Jørgensen, Uganda, p. 88.
We have digitized a total of 16,783 marriage certificates from the Kampala parish
and another 3,069 certificates from the three rural parishes. The Kampala records
concern the years 1895 to 2011, except for the registers covering 1899–1907,
which were lost after lightning set fire to the cathedral in 1910. The records of Fort
Portal cover the period 1911–2012, Butiti the years 1928–65, and Bundibugyo the
years 1936–74.
Some of the certificates were unsuited for social mobility analysis. First, to avoid
repeated entries of the same person, we included only bachelors (98.5 per cent
in Kampala and 96.2 per cent in the rural parishes). Out of these, we were able
to assign HISCO codes to 96.8 per cent (16,004) of Kampala grooms and to
98.1 per cent (2,898) of grooms from the three rural parishes. Moreover, HISCO
codes were assigned to 74.1 per cent (11,852) of Kampala fathers and to 91.6
per cent (2,898) of rural fathers. Either the remaining fathers had died or their
occupation was unrecorded.74 Overall, we coded the occupations of both father and
son in 11,554 cases for Kampala and in 2,613 cases for the three rural parishes.75
Table 3 reports the summary statistics.
Marriage registers are not without limitation when it comes to using them for
social mobility analysis. First, the registers report fathers’ and sons’ occupations at
the time of the son’s marriage. Observed at different stages during their life cycles,
the father’s career may thus be more advanced than when he was his son’s age.76
Indeed, our estimates of social mobility across the life cycle accordingly suggest
that our fathers do better on average when we observe them at their son’s wedding
74 If fathers’ death prior to the sons’ marriage was correlated with low social status, it may lead to a systematic
exclusion of lower-class families (Delger and Kok, ‘Bridegrooms’). However, we find no apparent differences in
the social-class distribution among sons with a deceased father compared to those whose fathers were alive (see
online app. S3). This suggests that our restricted sample does not suffer from biases caused by the exclusion of
records where the father’s occupation is missing.
75 Frequencies of father–son pairs are shown in online app. S4.
76 Long, ‘Surprising’.
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Table 3. Descriptive statistics
Kampala (N = 11,554) Toro parishes (N = 2,613)
Min. Max. Mean Min. Max. Mean
Year of marriage 1895 2011 1967 1911 2011 1952
Age at first marriage, groom 16 78 29.33 15 98 29.43
Literacy, groom 0 1 0.97 0 1 0.70
Father of groom deceased 0 1 0.07 0 1 0.05
Parish of marriage
Kampala 0.81
Fort Portal 0.11
Butiti 0.05
Bundibugyo 0.03
Social class of groom (HISCLASS)
I: Higher managers/professionals 0.16 0.05
II: Lower managers/professionals 0.49 0.34
III: Semi-skilled 0.14 0.12
IV: Farmers 0.09 0.30
V: Lower skilled 0.10 0.13
VI: Unskilled 0.02 0.06
Sources:Namirembe Cathedral archives, Kampala, marriage registers; St John’s Cathedral archives, Fort Portal, marriage registers;
St Peter’s Church archive, Butiti, marriage registers; St Barnabas’ Church archive, Bundibugyo, marriage registers.
than when we supposedly detect them at the time of their own wedding.77 This
seems to indicate that our estimates of intergenerational social mobility tend, if
anything, to underestimate upward mobility among the sampled grooms.
Second, the absence of Catholics, Muslims, and other non-Christian families
raises questions about the sample’s representation of the wider Ugandan
population. Christianity in Uganda spread faster than anywhere else in colonial
Africa.78 Colonial censuses suggest that about one in four Buganda were Christian
followers in 1911, 58 per cent in 1931, and about three in four in 1959. In Toro,
the Christian share grew gradually from 16 per cent in 1911 to 30 per cent in 1931,
reaching 54 per cent in 1959. In 2002, 85 per cent of Ugandans were Christians,
equally distributed between Protestants and Catholics.79
There are good reasons to believe that sampled Anglican grooms performed
better on average than both their Christian and non-Christian counterparts. Table 4
shows that Anglicans in late colonial Buganda had a clear advantage over Catholics
and non-Christians in terms of primary and secondary schooling. Our church-
marrying Anglican men were also more often literate, indicated by their signatures,
than the average Anglican in Buganda. While 64.1 per cent of adult Anglicans
had received primary schooling in 1959, 99.8 and 87.9 per cent of our sampled
Anglican grooms in Kampala and Toro, respectively, could sign their marriage
certificate. Ugandan census data confirm this view.80
Despite the rapid process of Christianization, the majority of Ugandans who
declared themselves Christian continued to marry according to traditional African
custom. According to the 1931 Uganda census, 70 per cent of African males in
77 A detailed description of our investigation of life-cycle mobility is reported in online app. S5.
78 Oliver, Missionary factor, p. 184; Hastings, Church in Africa, pp. 464–78.
79 UBOS, Census 2002.
80 de Haas and Frankema, ‘Gender’.
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Table 4. Education in Buganda by religion, 1959
Anglican Catholic Non-Christiana
Total population (6–15 years) 72,800 158,100 51,100
Share primary schooling (6–15 years) 76.8% 56.9% 14.7%
Total population (16–45 years) 231,500 450,400 126,000
Share primary schooling (16–45 years) 64.1% 49.3% 3.4%
Share secondary schooling (16–45 years)b 47.9% 24.3% 20.9%
Notes: a Non-Muslim.
b <4 years of education.
Source: Uganda, Census Returns 1959.
‘Greater Kampala’ identified themselves as Christian, but only 30 per cent had
celebrated a church wedding. In Western Uganda, in the districts of Mwenge and
Burahya, 19 per cent of males were married under Christian law. This pattern
persisted over time: the Church Missionary Society reported in 1956 that only
25 per cent of all married Anglicans in Buganda had celebrated a Christian ‘ring
marriage’.81 Similarly, it has been estimated that 80 per cent of all marital unions
in 1950s in Western Uganda were informal.82
Why did so many declared Christians continue to marry according to African
custom? The answer is that Anglican ordinances and practices in Uganda were
numerous and complex. First of all, a Christian wedding was by no means costless.
In preparation for their marriage, non-Christian men had to undergo baptism and,
for this, had to demonstrate reading ability in the vernacular.83 Financially, and in
addition to the traditional bridewealth, a church-marriage fee, free-will donations,
and other church-fund payments added to the liabilities.84 Christian husbands
also lost their conventional right to reclaim their bridewealth if their wife deserted
them,85 and their marriage could only be dissolved in the colonial courts.86 This
made church weddings unattractive for many Ugandans.
Far more important than this, and with later consequences for their offspring
(discussed below), Christian husbands had to commit to monogamy. This way,
African husbands and wives ideally ‘modelled their marriages—and their religious
lives—after a British template’,87 perceiving it as ‘an essential mark of civility’.88
Ugandan men who wished to baptize or marry according to Anglican bylaws
therefore had to divest themselves from all but one wife.89
Meanwhile, about half of all Anglican men, who married under the Christian
Marriage Ordinance, subsequently took another wife under customary rites.90 The
AnglicanChurch penalized this behaviour by refusing infant baptism of the children
of polygamous men. This meant their children did not enjoy unencumbered lineal
81 Taylor, Growth, p. 176.
82 Perlman, ‘Law’.
83 Peterson, ‘Politics’.
84 Taylor, Growth, pp. 177–8.
85 Ibid., p. 178.
86 Gutkind, ‘Town life’, p. 43.
87 Peterson, Ethnic patriotism, p. 96.
88 Peterson, ‘Politics’, p. 208.
89 Hansen, Mission, p. 274.
90 Taylor, Growth, pp. 143, 181, 185.
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14 MEIER ZU SELHAUSEN, VAN LEEUWEN, AND WEISDORF
inheritance of their father’s land through the colonial registry of freehold lands.
Later in life, they would also be barred frommarrying in an Anglican church.91 Not
only can this explain why many declared Christians did not celebrate a Christian
wedding; the reprisal made by the Anglican Church against polygamous men
also introduces a selection bias in our sample, since only sons of fathers entirely
devoted to Anglican ordinances and practices could be admitted to an Anglican
ring marriage.92
Thus the decision made by Ugandan males about whether to adhere to the rules
of the Anglican Church had potential consequences for whether their offspring
could enjoy the full social advantages that came with participation in the life of
the Anglican Church. These advantages included access to a limited number of
secondary mission schools and to social networks that were beneficial for their
sons’ professional advancement. In other words, polygamous fathers supposedly
constrained the social mobility prospects for their illegitimate children compared
to children born to monogamous men within legitimate Anglican marriages. We
therefore expect that our sampled grooms were in a more favourable position,
in terms of access to higher education and social advancement, than those
illegitimately born to polygamous Anglican fathers.93 Importantly, the selection
into this arguably more favourable position was not dependent on the fathers’
social status, but rather on compliance with the canon law of the Anglican Church.
We return to this important matter later on.
III
This section describes the occupational structure and intergenerational social
mobility of the sampled grooms and analyses how they evolved over time.
Figure 2 shows how the sampled Kampala grooms were distributed over time
across our six social classes described in table 2. Note first that, among the first
generation of Baganda to marry in the Anglican Church, nearly one in five had
close links to the Buganda royal court. This included clan leaders, chiefs, headmen,
and royal guards (classes I and II). The fairly high representation of class I and II
individuals in the data suggests that there was a strong liaison between the ruling
classes of Buganda and the Anglican mission from the beginning.
Figure 2 illustrates three main waves of occupational change across the long
twentieth century. Around the turn of the nineteenth century, an initial and rather
abrupt shift took place, from agriculture (class IV) towards craftsmanship and
low-skilled formal work (classes III and V). Among those marrying before 1900,
91 As a response to those prerequisites, many Baganda enrolled in alternative village schools and were baptized
into alternative Christian movements that had less strict requirements, such as theMalakite Church (see Peterson,
‘Politics’), the Catholic Church (see Doyle, ‘Parish baptism registers’), and also many village schools scattered
across Uganda (see Hanson, ‘Indigenous adaptation’).
92 In 1931, 70% of all males in ‘Greater Kampala’ identified themselves as Christians, but only 30% had
celebrated a Christian church wedding. In Western Uganda, 19% of males married under Christian law; see
Uganda, Census Returns 1931, p. 61.
93 In practice, the baptism of infants of polygamous men was postponed until the child was old enough to enter
a baptism class. It has been noted, however, that these children rarely received adult baptism; see Taylor, Growth,
p. 243. On the other hand, nearly half of all pupils (49%) in Uganda’s most prestigious Anglican boarding school
(Budo) in the 1950s were born to polygamous fathers, which seriously questions the effectiveness of the struggle
of the Anglican Church against polygamy; see ibid., p. 143.
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Figure 2. Class structure of Kampala grooms (%), 1895–2011
Note: The decade 1900–9 is limited to the years 1908–9.
Source: Namirembe Cathedral archives, Kampala, marriage registers.
four in five worked in agriculture, as farmers and fishermen, or in traditional crafts
such as barkcloth making. However, early in the colonial period, with the onset of
the twentieth century, manual work had been replaced by more skill-demanding,
non-manual jobs (class II).
A second wave of structural change emerged in Kampala between 1920 and
1960. This involved a gradual shift away from informal towards formal work.
In this period, our Anglican grooms entered newly formed social strata of
Ugandan society, working as salesmen for Asian businesses or as self-employed
commercial traders. Alternatively, they worked for the colonial government as
clerks, interpreters, policemen, and chiefs. Also, one out of four non-manual
occupational titles were linked to the mission society, including those of clergyman,
teacher, dispenser, and medical assistant. This shows how the Anglican mission
played a vital role in Africanizing formal work, at least among their religious
affiliates. The third and final wave of occupational change, which occurred in the
post-colonial era, involved an even greater formalization of labour, with a staggering
two out of three of our Kampala grooms working as lower or higher professionals.
Colonial class formation within Christian Buganda society has been clearly
documented in earlier works, which describe how new windows of opportunity
gradually created a new Christian middle and upper class during the colonial era.94
Christian mission schooling was an important driver of this process, expediting not
only reading and writing skills, but also technical training in medical care and
vocational training in carpentry and sewing.95 The training of African catechists,
teachers, and medical workers was crucial for the spread of the gospel, which in
turn depended on the recruitment of mission school and hospital staff.96 Mission
94 Hansen, Mission, p. 259.
95 Hattersley, Baganda at home, pp. 198–9; Mullins, Wonderful story, p. 18; Taylor, Growth, p. 85.
96 Kaplan, ‘Africanization’.
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Figure 3. Intergenerational social mobility in Kampala (% of total grooms), 1895–
2011
Source: As for fig. 2.
school training also catered to a growing demand for skilled African administrative
workers, especially from the late 1920s on. The British authorities from the very
beginning relied on hundreds of appointed Baganda clerks and administrators to
oversee the Protectorate’s provinces outside Buganda.97 This allowed competent
Baganda to exercise ‘sub-imperial authority’98 over Uganda’s peripheries and
coincided with the foundation of the British government’s technical training college
of Makerere and Mulago Medical School.99
What did the shifts in the occupational structure look like in terms of social
mobility? Figure 3 presents the shares of sons subject to up- and downwardmobility
as opposed to those staying in their class of origin. Presenting the social mobility
rates by the grooms’ year of marriage, figure 3 suggests that Buganda society—as
captured by our Kampala grooms—was comparatively immobile at the onset of
British rule, with three out of four sons remaining in their class of origin in the
last decade of the nineteenth century. This high degree of social ‘reproduction’
decreased dramatically over the course of the colonial era. By 1910, less than two
decades after the British annexed Uganda, an astonishing three in four sons moved
to a class different from that of their father. This portrays a colonial labour market
that appears remarkably fluid, at least for the sampled grooms.
Up until the 1940s, and after an initial increase in upward mobility, downward
mobility in Kampala was on the rise. This was linked to a growing number of
Europeans and Asians found among Kampala’s higher professionals.100 However,
downward mobility was also caused by the fact that many sons of chiefs
97 Low, Fabrication, pp. 150–83.
98 Roberts, ‘Sub-imperialism’.
99 Iliffe, East African doctors, pp. 60–1; Goldthorpe, African elite, pp. 1–23.
100 Uganda, Census Returns 1911; idem, Census Returns 1959; Jamal, ‘Asians’; de Haas and Frankema, ‘Gender’.
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(class I) dropped down the social ladder, as landed chieftainships gradually shrank
in number during this period.101
Meanwhile, in the late colonial and early post-colonial periods, after the Asian
trading monopoly was broken and the colonial administration became increasingly
Africanized,102 upward mobility became the leading mobility outcome. The
considerable rates of social advancement shown in figure 3, with close to 50 per
cent of the sampled grooms moving up the social ladder, illustrate a surprising
degree of social mobility among Ugandans situated in a favourable social and
political environment. Upon Uganda’s independence in 1962, the formation of
an Anglican-dominated political party strengthened the already strong relationship
between the Anglican Church and the state apparatus.103 So when European and
Asian civil servants were replaced by Ugandans, Anglicans were favoured over
Catholics and other religious groups, causing the share of higher professionals
(class I) among the sampled Anglicans to increase during the 1960s (figure 2)
and their rate of upward mobility to rise even further than during colonial times
(figure 3).
In the 1970s, an extended period of military conflict and economic decline
emerged with the presidencies of Idi Amin (1971–9) and Milton Obote II (1980–
5). Currency depreciations caused the cost of living to increase between 200 and
500 per cent during this period. Plunging real wages in several sectors of the
economy forced many Ugandans to leave their wage-earning jobs and escape urban
poverty by resorting to rural work.104 Amin’s expulsion of the Asian population in
1972, which was intended to transfer Asian shops and businesses to Ugandans,105
also led to a rise of the magendo (an informal, black-market economy). Although
this did not have much effect on our observed occupational structures (figure 2) or
rates of upward mobility (figure 3), both of which remained largely stable during
the Amin presidency, the shift towards more informal work is visible deeper down
in our data. The share of informal or self-employed class II professions, including
‘traders’, ‘businessmen’, and ‘shop owners’, doubled between 1962 and 1986, from
11 to 22 per cent, and was counterbalanced by declining shares of formal (that is,
waged) class II occupations, such as ‘clerks’, ‘policemen’, and ‘teachers’.106 The
shift away from wage employment towards informal entrepreneurship illustrates
the occupational change among the middle class that resulted from the collapsing
Ugandan economy and Amin’s efforts to disempower and replace the Anglican
state apparatus.107 With the end of political turmoil, upward mobility rates quickly
began to grow again after 1985, with an overwhelming 60–70 per cent of our
Anglican grooms moving up the social ladder.
Tables 5 and 6 take a closer at these developments using outflow mobility rates.
These rates provide information about the social-class destination of the sampled
sons conditional on their social origin (their father’s class). We have divided the
Kampala sample into colonial (table 5) and post-colonial (table 6) sub-samples.
101 Southall, ‘Determinants’; Hanson, Landed obligation, pp. 150–4.
102 Elkan, Migrants, pp. 48–74.
103 Ward, ‘History of Christianity’.
104 Jørgensen, Uganda, pp. 298–300; Kasfir, ed., State, p. 91.
105 Jørgensen, Uganda, p. 299.
106 See online app. S6.
107 Pirouet, ‘Religion’; Jørgensen, Uganda, pp. 306–7.
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Table 5. Outflow mobility rates in Kampala (row percentages), 1895–1962
Groom’s class
Father’s class I II III IV V VI Total N
I: Higher professional 10.4a 57.4a 12.7a 6.5a 11.9a 1.0 100 1,057
II: Lower professional 4.5a 58.6 17.5a 6.5a 11.6a 1.3 100 955
III: Semi-skilled 1.7a 34.2 42.6a 5.0 14.1 2.3 100 298
IV: Farmer 5.2a 42.4a 16.1a 24.0a 11.1a 1.2 100 1,905
V: Lower skilled 3.1a 37.3 32.1a 5.7 19.7 2.2 100 458
VI: Unskilled 2.8a 29.2a 37.5a 8.3a 15.3 6.9 100 72
Total (%) 5.8a 47.8a 19.2a 13.4a 12.5a 1.4a 100
N 273 2,268 909 636 592 67 4,745
Note: a Outflow mobility during the colonial era is significantly different from the post-colonial era (tab. 6): p<0.05.
Source: Namirembe Cathedral archives, Kampala, marriage registers.
Table 6. Outflow mobility rates (row percentages), Kampala, 1963–2011
Groom’s class
Father’s class I II III IV V VI Total N
I: Higher professional 33.1 48.1 6.1 3.8 6.7 2.2 100 640
II: Lower professional 25.2 54.8 7.5 4.2 6.0 2.3 100 1,419
III: Semi-skilled 15.6 41.1 26.4 6.1 8.7 2.2 100 231
IV: Farmer 21.9 50.6 9.6 7.7 8.4 1.7 100 4,095
V: Lower skilled 24.8 37.2 16.8 4.9 14.2 2.2 100 226
VI: Unskilled 18.7 53.0 7.1 2.5 9.6 9.1 100 198
Total (%) 23.4 50.6 9.6 6.3 8.0 2.1 100
N 1,593 3,443 654 430 545 144 6,809
Source: As for tab. 5.
The percentages reported in the diagonals in italics represent the shares of sons,
who remained in their class of origin. Upward mobility appears to the left of the
diagonals and downward mobility to the right.
Table 5 conveys several important messages about social mobility in colonial
Kampala. It confirms that social mobility was remarkably common among the
Anglican grooms, and that the colonial labourmarket was surprisingly fluid. Among
the more immobile groups, lower professions (class II) had three in five sons staying
put, while two in five sons remained immobile among craftsman fathers (class III).
In the remaining groups, no more than one in four sons stayed in their class of
origin. This illustrates a remarkable degree of social mobility among our sampled
grooms regardless of their parental social background.
The movers did not simply change to the neighbouring classes, but assumed
positions across the entire social ladder. This resonates with Currie’s observation
that the occupational status of Ugandan school graduates was highly independent
of their fathers’ educational and occupational backgrounds.108 Moreover, table 5
portrays a society in which sons of blue-collar workers (classes III–VI) were clearly
able to enter white-collar work (classes I–II). A remarkable 45 per cent of sons from
a farming background (class IV) moved into white-collar work. This also captures
108 Currie, ‘Family background’.
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the ongoing structural change in colonial Kampala. Similarly, one in three sons of
craftsmen (class III) moved into non-manual work. These findings contradict the
‘buffer zone thesis’, proposed by Goldthorpe, that sons of blue-collar fathers in
Victorian England struggled to enter white-collar work.109
Our findings from Anglican Kampala align with evidence from colonial Ghana
and Senegal which shows that secondary education was very common among the
sons of farmers, herders, and fishermen and was used as a means to enter white-
collar work.110 Table 5 also demonstrates a notable degree of upward mobility
among sons of lower-class (class V) fathers. Less than 7 per cent of sons of fathers
from the unskilled section of society (class VI) remained in their class of origin. A
startling one in three of them made it all the way to the top of the social ladder
(classes I and II). At the same time, sons coming from the social segments above
the lowest social class very rarely dropped to the bottom of society (class VI).
Were grooms who came from the countryside more likely to experience upward
mobility than those based in Kampala? While we do not know the birthplace of the
sampled grooms, we do have information about their place of residence at the time
of marriage. Around 50 per cent of sampled grooms lived outside the wider area of
modern Kampala during the colonial era, dropping to 38 per cent during the post-
colonial era. Online appendix S7 sheds light on this matter, showing that the social
mobility patterns were indeed very similar: upward mobility was not statistically
significantly different between two groups and downward mobility trends also
moved in tandem. Hence, rural residence does not seem to have influenced the
likelihood of social advancement.
How were those great leaps of social mobility that we observe achieved?
What type of work did the grooms engage in when they moved up the social
ladder? Did they move into any sector of the colonial economy, or was upward
mobility restricted to specific sectors? Figure 4 presents six different occupational
categories that upwardly mobile sons went into: ‘mission workers’ (for example,
teachers, clergymen, medical assistants); ‘clerks and professionals’ (for example,
interpreters, policemen); ‘traders’; ‘farmers and low-skilled workers’; ‘craftsmen’
(for example, carpenters, masons); and ‘chiefs’ (and sub-chiefs). On the eve of
Britain’s annexation of Uganda, upward mobility was mainly linked to chieftaincy,
but social advancement quickly became associated with moving into craftsmanship
instead during the 1900s. In the 1920s, formal employment in the colonial
economy, including mission work, overtook traditional craftsmanship as the most
frequent category for upward mobility. This pattern stabilized after the 1940s, and
formal employment continued to remain an important path to upward mobility
until independence. The pre-colonial avenue to higher status—chieftaincy—
concurrently lost its former importance.
Table 6 illustrates that the social mobility trends of the late colonial period
(table 5) continued after independence. There was a significant degree of upward
mobility among the sampled grooms born to the lowest social classes and a
continual transfer of sons from blue-collar family backgrounds into white-collar
work. Among grooms coming from farming backgrounds (classes IV, V, and VI),
nearly two in three made it into the upper layers of society (classes I and II). This
109 Goldthorpe, Social mobility, pp. 47–55.
110 Foster, ‘Secondary schooling’; Iliffe, Africans, p. 231.
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Figure 4. Types of work of upwardly mobile sons in Kampala, 1895–1962
Source: As for fig. 2.
remarkable transfer out of agriculture resonates with Bossuroy and Cogneau’s
finding that intergenerational mobility between farm and non-farm work was more
common in post-colonial Uganda than in other African countries.111 In fact, our
Anglican sons from Kampala and the three rural parishes were twice as likely to
move into non-farm work compared to the general Ugandan male population.112
Key reasons for this difference are that our Anglican grooms were mainly drawn
from Kampala and that Anglicans were more successful on average in attaining
education (see table 4).
IV
Pre-colonial political power in Buganda resided with the king and his landed
chiefs who ruled over the peasantry. Although chieftaincies had their roots in
pre-colonial times, this institution was significantly reshaped by colonial indirect
rule. Compared to the arguably more open pre-colonial succession process of
traditional chiefs, described in the existing literature, the nature of eligibility
changed under indirect rule when linked to Christianity.113 Under indirect British
rule, many Baganda (and mostly Anglican) chiefs became colonial officials who
were employed to extract profits from cash-cropping farmers.114 This put them
in a supreme position for consolidating their pre-colonial societal power. Evidence
from colonial and post-colonial Nigeria andUganda115 and from present-day Sierra
111 Bossuroy and Cogneau, ‘Social mobility’.
112 The share of farmers’ sons working in non-farm sectors was even three times higher in our Anglican sample
compared to Uganda’s male population. See online app. S8.
113 Kodesh, ‘Renovating’.
114 Wrigley, Crops and wealth, pp. 10–11.
115 Mamdani, Citizen and subject, pp. 52–61.
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Figure 5. Conditional probability of entering class I, Kampala, 1895–1962
Note: Polynomial smoothed lines.
Source: As for fig. 2.
Leone116 have congruently suggested that indirect rule (described as ‘decentralised
despotism’) continued and even perpetuated the power of chiefs into the post-
colonial era. It is also held that British colonial officials discouraged post-primary
education of the general population, except for the sons of chiefs, whose training
was aimed at building local administrative capacities.117
The declining role of chieftaincy for upward mobility indicated in figure 4 raises
important questions about the colonial legacy of indirect rule in Uganda. The
nature of our data enables us to explore the persistence of power among the colonial
political elite (that is, chiefs) across the colonial era. To this end, figures 6 and
7 compare the conditional probability of sons of chiefs with that of sons from
the three lowest social classes (classes IV, V, and VI) of entering social classes I
(higher professionals) and II (lower professionals) respectively. Initially, sons of
chiefs had significantly higher probabilities of reaching class I than lower-class sons
(figure 5). This resonates with earlier evidence that Ugandan chiefs’ descendants
enjoyed privileged access to mission high schools, such as King’s College Budo,
and that this placed them in an advantageous position for the future recruitment
of chiefs, administrative clerks, and interpreters.118
Towards the end of the colonial period, however, there was no longer a statistical
difference. Around 5 per cent of sampled sons made it to the highest section of
society, regardless of whether their father was a chief or belonged to the lowest social
classes (figure 5). This development implies that meritocratic criteria eventually
matched status ascription for attaining the highest social status in Kampala.
Although sons of chiefs faced mildly higher odds of becoming lower professionals
(class II) than their low-social-class counterparts during the entire colonial era
116 Acemoglu, Reed, and Robinson, ‘Chiefs’.
117 Sutton, ‘Education’; Lloyd et al., ‘Spread of primary schooling’.
118 Fallers, ‘Despotism’; Cartey and Kilson, Africa reader, p. 77; Musisi, ‘Colonial and missionary education’.
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Figure 6. Conditional probability of entering class II, Kampala, 1895–1962
Note: Polynomial smoothed lines.
Source: As for fig. 2.
(figure 6), the probabilities increased markedly for both groups, with more than
half of all sons of lower-class fathers entering class II by the time of independence.
These conclusions challenge the perception of ‘chiefs as despots’119 in the sense
that indirect colonial rule in Uganda did not extend the power of pre-colonial and
colonial political elites (that is, chiefs) into the post-independence era, at least not
among those with an Anglican pathway to social mobility.
The weakening power of chieftaincies in colonial Buganda has many
explanations. One is that chieftaincy was not exclusively obtained by lineal
descent.120 More importantly, colonial laws introduced in the late 1920s, which
reduced rents and levies on cash crops, favoured smallholders and tenants and
ensured them against the oligarchy of landed chiefs.121 The elimination of hundreds
of chieftainships, the reduction of rents imposed on farmers by chiefs, and the
breakup of larger estates after 1930 arguably made it harder for chiefs to secure a
high-status position for their offspring. Colonial land reforms also helped thousands
of non-elite Baganda to the purchase of land, which they paid for through their
earnings from wage work or profits made in cotton cultivation.122 The new landed
class received substantial rents from cotton and coffee exports,123 which helped
them finance the education and upward social mobility of their sons.
The colonial elevation of descendants from the lower classes to high-status
positions also informs us that secondary education was not just a privilege granted
to the sons of chiefs. King’s College Budo, the most prestigious Anglican high
school in Buganda, testifies to the inclusiveness of mission schooling by the
119 Mamdani, Citizen and subject, pp. 52–61 (quotation p. 37).
120 Fallers, King’s men, p. 10.
121 Southall, ‘Concepts of elite’; Powesland, Economic policy and labour, pp. 22–7; Richards, ed., Economic
development, p. 5.
122 Hansen, ‘Church and state in early colonial Uganda’; Hanson, Landed obligation, p. 194.
123 Elkan, Migrants, pp. 13–14; de Haas, ‘Measuring’.
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Table 7. Class I occupations of sons by fathers’ social background, Kampala,
1895–1962
Father Father
Chief (I) Class IV–VI
Groom’s occupation N % Groom’s occupation N %
Chief 54 63.5 Chief 31 27.0
Medical doctor 9 10.6 Engineer 22 19.1
Engineer 8 9.4 Medical doctor 17 14.8
Interpreter 6 7.1 Accountant 16 13.9
Accountant 2 2.4 Interpreter 6 5.2
Clan leader 2 2.4 Clergyman 5 4.3
Clergyman 2 2.4 Journalist 4 3.5
Architect 1 1.2 Scientist 3 2.6
Pharmacist 1 1.2 Pharmacist 2 1.7
Other professionals 9 7.8
Total 85 100.0 115 100.0
Source: As for tab. 5.
late colonial era: only 8 per cent of the school’s attendees came from a chiefly
background, whereas 61 per cent were of farmer descent and 21 per cent had a
father engaged inmission work or the colonial administration.124 This helped create
a newChristian-educated class, which ‘would increasingly challenge the old system,
feeling itself excluded from social status and political authority’.125 Our findings
also give numerical expression to earlier narratives about the rapid expansion
and importance of mission education in Uganda. This includes Iliffe’s contention
that ‘African education did more to foster social mobility than to entrench old
privileged classes, largely because tropical Africa has no long-established literate
elites’,126 and because salaried careers, functionally divorced from landownership
and production, became a corridor to high-status attainment regardless of social
background.127
The new income-earning opportunities and social mobility of the lower social
classes deprived chiefs of their monopoly over the labour market, while ‘cash wages,
taxes in rupees, and labour demands slowly began to undermine the economic
and social logic of chiefly authority’.128 Table 7 highlights this, comparing the
most frequent class I occupations held by sons of chiefs and sons of lower-class
fathers, respectively. Although chieftaincy was relatively more common among the
sons of chiefs, other higher professions, in mission schooling and medical care or
administrative work, presented descendants from the lower social classes with a
new path to high social status. The occupational patterns of sons of chiefs and
sons of lower-class fathers entering class II were remarkably similar (table 8).
124 Taylor, Growth, p. 277.
125 Reid, History of modern Africa, p. 185; Nugent, Africa since independence, pp. 13–14; Collins, Problems,
pp. 86–7.
126 Iliffe, Africans, p. 230.
127 Consistently, it has been shown that fathers’ lack of education and social standing did not disadvantage their
sons’ educational attainments, social positions, or standards of living; Wantchekon et al., ‘Education’.
128 Hanson, Landed obligation, pp. 150–2.
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Table 8. Class II occupations of sons by fathers’ social background, Kampala,
1895–1962
Father Father
Chief (I) Class IV–VI
Groom’s occupation N % Groom’s occupation N %
Clerk 219 43.0 Clerk 349 34.9
Trader 86 16.9 Trader 201 20.1
Teacher 77 15.1 Teacher 197 19.7
Medical assistant 39 7.7 Medical assistant 44 4.4
Policeman 14 2.8 Policeman 39 3.9
Dispenser 10 2.0 Dispenser 23 2.3
Shop owner 9 1.8 Shop owner 23 2.3
Sub-chief 9 1.8 Sub-chief 17 1.7
Surveyor 7 1.4 Headman 15 1.5
Other 37 7.3 Other 92 9.2
Total 509 100.0 999 100.0
Source: As for tab. 5.
These illustrations show how Baganda chiefs gradually lost their initial advantage
in placing their offspring in high-status positions under indirect colonial rule.
V
The sample from Toro County was obtained by merging our three rural parishes
in Western Uganda. Table 9 reports the occupational structures by social class
in each of the three rural parishes. As in Kampala, we observe an initial shift
towards non-agricultural activities in Toro’s capital Fort Portal and in Butiti by
the mid-colonial era, whereas the more remote parish of Bundibugyo remained
predominantly agricultural throughout. The significantly lower shares of non-
manual labour opportunities compared to Kampala, however, clearly stand out.
Rural occupational structures were also more sensitive to economic instability
under Amin and Obote in the 1970s–80s, when Fort Portal and Bundibugyo saw
rising shares of agricultural workers. This was accompanied by falling shares of
formal professions and coincided with plunging real wages and evidence of de-
urbanization at the time.
Except for the 1970s–80s, when almost every second groom remained in his
class of origin, usually no more than one in four stayed put (table 10). In these
relatively fluid rural societies, upward mobility generally outperformed downward
mobility, with half of all groomsmoving up the social ladder in Fort Portal as well as
in Butiti. The trends (though not the magnitudes) of social mobility in Fort Portal
largely followed those of Kampala during the post-colonial era. These patterns
contrast with the socially static parish of Bundibugyo, where about two in three
grooms remained in their class of origin (meaning farmers) after independence.
The virtual absence of non-agricultural market activities undoubtedly put a firm
lid on the prospects for social mobility in this area.
As in colonial Kampala, rural sons subject to social mobility literally moved into
any social layer (table 11). At one extreme, while half the sons of higher and lower
professionals (classes I and II) stayed in their class of origin, the remaining half went
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Table 9. Class distribution of grooms from Toro parishes, 1910–2011
Fort Portal I II III IV V VI N
1910–19 5.7 22.9 32.2 10.2 22.9 6.1 245
1920–9 3.3 47.0 20.8 8.7 15.3 4.9 183
1930–9 2.5 33.1 16.5 22.3 23.1 2.5 121
1940–9 3.5 30.4 8.7 18.3 25.2 13.9 115
1950–9 2.0 46.3 10.1 18.8 14.8 8.1 149
1960–9 9.0 50.6 10.1 15.7 9.0 5.6 89
1970–9 6.5 40.5 3.3 37.9 7.2 4.6 153
1980–9 9.3 28.4 2.1 46.2 3.4 10.6 236
1990–9 10.0 68.6 4.3 10.0 4.3 2.9 70
2000–11 34.2 42.1 6.6 6.6 10.5 0.0 76
Butiti I II III IV V VI N
1928–9 0.0 30.0 14.0 8.0 28.0 20.0 50
1930–9 1.1 24.9 13.9 30.4 16.5 13.2 273
1940–9 1.6 42.5 7.1 29.1 16.5 3.2 127
1950–9 1.1 39.8 17.1 15.9 23.3 2.8 176
1960–5 3.5 33.7 15.1 26.7 8.1 12.8 86
Bundibugyo I II III IV V VI N
1940–9 0.0 22.5 1.3 62.5 10.0 3.8 80
1950–9 1.6 26.1 3.2 67.0 1.6 0.5 188
1960–9 1.5 16.5 3.0 79.0 0.0 0.0 133
1970–4 0.0 9.5 0.0 85.7 4.8 0.0 21
Sources: St John’s Cathedral archives, Fort Portal, marriage registers; St Peter’s Church archive, Butiti, marriage registers;
St Barnabas’ Church archive, Bundibugyo, marriage registers.
Table 10. Intergenerational mobility in rural Toro parishes (% of total grooms),
1911–2011
Fort Portal Butiti Bundibugyo
Up Down Immobile N Up Down Immobile N Up Down Immobile N
1910–19 63.7 23.3 13.0 245
1920–9 61.5 22.5 15.9 182 46.0 24.0 30.0 50
1930–9 39.7 32.2 28.1 121 36.6 24.5 38.8 273
1940–9 33.0 44.4 22.6 115 49.6 22.8 27.6 127 27.0 11.4 61.6 74
1950–9 39.2 36.9 23.9 148 45.5 33.0 21.6 176 27.1 7.0 65.9 188
1960–9 51.7 32.4 15.9 89 50.0 24.1 25.9 87 19.6 0.8 79.7 133
1970–9 36.6 17.0 46.4 153 9.5 4.8 85.7 21
1980–9 35.2 13.6 51.3 236
1990–9 64.3 12.9 22.9 70
2000–11 51.3 15.8 32.9 76
Total 680 351 405 1,436 336 187 190 713 98 23 295 416
Sources: As for tab. 9.
into blue-collar work, with almost one in five dropping to the bottom of society
(classes V and VI). At the other extreme, sons of farmers (class IV) faced a 50 per
cent chance of upward mobility, while one in three sons of unskilled workers (class
VI) reached the two highest classes (classes I and II). Again, these large leaps in
social status describe a society with only limited social barriers, as least among our
sampled Anglicans. The post-colonial period displayed similar trends (table 12),
but with the important exception that the likelihood of sons of upper-class fathers
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Table 11. Outflow mobility rates (row percentages) in the rural parishes, 1911–62
Groom’s class
Father’s class I II III IV V VI Total N
I: Higher professional 12.2 37.4a 15.7a 14.8 13.9 6.1 100 115
II: Lower professional 1.1a 46.6 12.9 16.3 17.4 5.6 100 178
III: Semi-skilled 1.3a 16.0a 29.3 32.0 17.3 4.0 100 75
IV: Farmer 2.0a 32.1 13.1a 33.2a 15.1a 4.5 100 1,092
V: Lower skilled 2.1 25.3a 21.1 11.6 34.7a 5.3 100 95
VI: Unskilled 1.2a 32.3 16.3 14.4 16.7 19.1a 100 257
Total (%) 2.4∗ 32.9 14.8a 26.5a 16.6a 6.8 100
N 44 596 268 480 301 123 1,812
Notes: a p<0.05.
Outflow mobility during the colonial era is significantly different from the post-colonial era (tab. 12).
Sources: As for tab. 9.
Table 12. Outflow mobility rates (row percentages), rural parishes, 1963–2011
Groom’s class
Father’s class I II III IV V VI Total N
I: Higher professional 20.0 54.0 2.0 10.0 12.0 2.0 100 50
II: Lower professional 21.4 49.5 6.8 8.7 9.7 3.9 100 103
III: Semi-skilled 22.2 44.4 22.2 11.1 0.0 0.0 100 9
IV: Farmer 7.9 32.7 3.5 48.5 3.5 3.9 100 594
V: Lower skilled 7.7 61.5 7.7 14.4 7.7 0.0 100 13
VI: Unskilled 6.3 21.9 3.1 12.5 6.3 50.0 100 32
Total (%) 10.5 36.3 4.1 38.6 5.0 5.5 100
N 84 291 33 309 40 44 801
Sources: As for tab. 9.
staying in white-collar work increased to 70 per cent, and that the sons of unskilled
fathers remained at the bottom of society more often than during colonial times.
The probabilities of sons of farmers and craftsmen (classes III and IV) dropping
down into the lower classes also became less likely after independence.
The lack of major structural changes in the rural parishes during the colonial
era raises questions about the type of work that upward mobility involved. As in
Kampala (figure 4), rural social advancement was initially linked to craftsmanship
(figure 7). Formal-sector employment came to dominate from the 1920s onwards,
but with the important difference that mission work, in the absence of a large
colonial bureaucracy, was the main means of climbing the social ladder.
VI
This article has offered a first glance at intergenerational social mobility in colonial
Africa. Our sampled grooms, even though they came from all layers of Ugandan
society, in many ways represent a privileged group of Christian Africans. They were
privileged in terms of access to higher education and labour market opportunities,
which they could enter through their parents’ conversion and strict commitment
to the rules and regulations of the Anglican Church. This created a pathway for
the sampled grooms into a remarkably fluid colonial economy in which traditional
© Economic History Society 2017 Economic History Review, 00, 0 (2017)
ehr12616 W3G-ehr.cls November 24, 2017 13:35
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
SOCIAL MOBILITY AMONG CHRISTIAN AFRICANS 27
Figure 7. Types of work of upwardly mobile sons in rural Toro parishes, 1911–62
Sources: St John’s Cathedral archives, Fort Portal, marriage registers; St Peter’s Church archive, Butiti, marriage registers; St
Barnabas’ Church archive, Bundibugyo, marriage registers.
claims to status did not confer automatic advantages to pre-colonial elites (that is,
chiefs), and where the barrier between blue- and white-collar work was surprisingly
low. Even the most modest families could hope that their sons, helped by mission
education and close ties between the Anglican Church and the colonial state, could
climb the social ladder and reach the higher levels of Ugandan society.
Although many Ugandan chiefs were appointed as administrative officials under
indirect colonial rule and in this way exercised both political and economic power
over the local population, our micro-evidence portrays a society in which access
to secondary education and a labour market seemingly based on meritocratic
criteria caused chiefs’ colonial power gradually to disappear. This shift, which was
helped by colonial land reforms and increased African access to Kampala’s formal
labour market, challenges the perception of British indirect rule as ‘decentralised
despotism’.129 It also illustrates how mission education did more to foster social
mobility among our sampled grooms than to entrench the traditional privileged
classes. Upward social mobility among our Kampala grooms grew persistently from
the mid-colonial period up until the present, although with some reversal towards
informal and agricultural work during the economically devastating precedencies
of Amin and Obote. In rural areas, where the colonial economy was less developed
than in Kampala, employment in mission churches, schools, and hospitals opened
important windows of opportunity for social advancement into formal work.
Returning to the debates outlined in the introduction, this demonstrates that
the colonial economy in Uganda did issue ‘tickets to upward social mobility’,
at least to a new generation of Christian Africans, whose parents self-selected
into the religious and political networks surrounding the Anglican Church. This
129 Mamdani, Citizen and subject, pp. 52–61 (quotation p. 37).
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included not just the sons of traditional Ugandan elites, but all social classes.
However, although the occupational backgrounds of the sampled fathers did not
appear to present any hindrance for social advancement among their sons, tickets
to upward mobility arguably came with other strings attached. These involved a
break with traditional customs of traditional religious beliefs and marital living
in exchange for a way of life modelled after a western template. Career-building
in this context began with Anglican baptism and was followed by school and
vocational training and later monogamous church marriage in compliance with the
laws of the Anglican Church. The social mobility experienced by our Ugandan
grooms demonstrates that new possibilities for social and political advancement
in colonial Uganda that were opened up by adherence to Anglican Christianity.
More liberal forms of Christianity, such as the Malakite Church, which arose out
of protest against the rigidities of the Anglican Church and merged traditional
Baganda culture and Christian theology by baptizing children born to polygamous
men, were suppressed by the Baganda establishment with the assistance of the
colonial government.130 In this light, it would appear that Anglican Ugandans
made themselves legible in the eyes of the British colonial authorities through a
careful career-building process. A possible interpretation of this, and a reason for
the enhanced performance of Anglican Ugandans described in earlier studies,131
would be that Anglican Christianity essentially functioned as a ‘screening device’
among the common population, that was used by the colonial government to fill
pre-eminent positions within the colonial administration and possibly the broader
formal labour market.
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